Australia’s COVID inquiry shows why the creation of a lasting “disease control center” is more urgent than ever

The long-awaited independent inquiry into Australia’s response to Covid-19 has been published Todaycontaining lessons on how the nation can better prepare for future pandemics.

The 868-page report presents nine guiding recommendations and 26 actions, including 19 to be implemented over the next 12-18 months. They form the basis for future pandemic preparedness.

The investigation found that Australia, initially robust in national solidarity, took swift action to close its national borders. This bought crucial time, but Australia was ill-prepared for a crisis on the scale of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Australia’s response lacked robust central coordination and leadership. Communication about public health advice to the most vulnerable groups was often contradictory or inappropriate. Public trust has been further eroded by a lack of transparency in decision-making, such as disease modeling, that has underpinned crucial public health responses.

IN viewfinderan investigation found that a full-fledged Australian Center for Disease Control (CDC) could have made a huge difference. In response, the federal government committed today AUD 251 million to establish such a center in Canberra.

What did the investigation reveal?

1. Early rapid response and consensus helped keep us sheltered. As an inland country, Australia was able to close its borders in preparation for the eventual, inevitable spread of SARS CoV-2 throughout its population. However, she was not prepared for pandemic-related quarantines.

2. Initially, communication was clear and consistent. It didn’t take long. Massive uncertainty, rapidly changing circumstances, differing expert opinions and the politicization of responses have challenged communication strategies. Communication with different ethnic groups and vulnerable populations was often suboptimal. Going forward, misinformation and misinformation need to be addressed through improved health literacy and proactive communication.

3. We lacked health care infrastructure that could not cope with emergency loads, as the investigation found, although health care workers “came together” in a remarkable way. Aged care homes were particularly vulnerable and had penniless infection control practices. More broadly, there were supply chain issues and insufficient supplies of crucial infection prevention and control equipment, such as masks and gloves. Australia was unable to produce them and was left at the mercy of foreign suppliers.

4. Analysis of the virus’s genetic material and extensive testing have been crucial to tracking the evolution and spread of the virus. Pathogen genomics for example in Up-to-date South Wales and Victoria, enabled accurate tracking virus variants and local transmission. However, data sharing between jurisdictions was penniless and there was narrow national coordination to optimize data interpretation and response.

5. There was a lack of clear, evidence-based decision-making. The disease models on which key decisions were based were muddy and not subject to scrutiny or peer review.

6. Vulnerable groups in society, including children, have suffered disproportionately. School closures due to Covid-19 have been particularly damaging as they have disproportionately impacted learning, socializing and development affected children from lower socio-economic classes. Strict social isolation also increases the risk of domestic violence, as well as anxiety and other mental health effects. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were at greater risk due to inequalities in service delivery and social determinants of health.

7. Research is crucial and should be scalable quickly. Good surveillance systems for emerging infectious diseases and future pandemic threats need to be put in place. Patient samples need to be stored so that we can quickly investigate disease mechanisms and develop the necessary diagnostic tests. The inquiry recognized Australia needs to develop its own vaccines, and access to mRNA technology was identified as an crucial health security measure given challenges in accessing vaccines.

8. Global solidarity and cooperation create a safer word for all.
Clear inequalities in access to Covid vaccines, opened major fault lines in international relations and continue to complicate the development of a global pandemic treaty.

9. Emerging diseases that focus on a single health should be considered a ‘persistent threat’. In our contemporary, interconnected world with high concentrations of human and animal populations coupled with stressed ecosystems, modern diseases with pandemic potential will continue to emerge at an unprecedented rate. This requires overall focus.

How could the CDC make a difference?

One of the key findings of the inquiry is that the lack of robust, independent and central coordination hampered our response to the pandemic.

The main shortcoming limiting the ability to target the response was the inadequate flow of data between jurisdictions. This is needed to understand:

• transmission dynamics
• defenselessness in people with severe illness
• circulating virus variants.

The investigation also highlighted the need to analyze data in near real time.

Good, data-driven and clear, evidence-based policy. This is a key area for the future Australian CDC to address. The CDC will function as a “data hub” and Canberra will offer an ideal location to support a multi-jurisdictional “hub and spoke” model.

The modern Australian CDC is expected to be launched around January 2026pending approval of regulations. The ongoing challenge will be to ensure optimal long-term health benefits for all Australians.